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Abstract. We start by briefly surveying research on optimal stopping games since their introduction
by E.B. Dynkin more than 40 years ago. Recent renewed interest to Dynkin’s games is due, in particular,
to the study of Israeli (game) options introduced in 2000. We discuss the work on these options and
related derivative securities for the last decade. Among various results on game options we consider
error estimates for their discrete approximations, swing game options, game options in markets with
transaction costs and other questions.
1. Introduction
Optimal stopping games were introduced in 1969 by E.B. Dynkin in [30] as an extension of the optimal
stopping problem which was already actively studied since 1950ies. Optimal stopping and, in particular,
its game version was often discussed on Dynkin’s undergraduate seminar at Moscow State University in
the end of 1960ies which resulted in papers [44], [47], [56] and [57].
The original setup of optimal stopping games consisted of a probability space (Ω,F ,P), of a filtration
of σ-algebras {Ft}, Ft ⊂ F with either t ∈ N = {0, 1, 2, ...} (discrete time case) or t ∈ R+ = [0,∞)
(continuous time case), of {Ft}-adapted payoff process {Xt} and of a pair of {Ft}-adapted 0–1 valued
”permission” processes ϕ
(i)
t , i = 1, 2 such that the player i is allowed to stop the game at time t if and
only if ϕ
(i)
t = 1. If the game is stopped at time t then the first player pays to the 2nd one the sum Xt.
Clearly, if ϕ1t ≡ 1 and ϕ(2)t ≡ 0 we arrive back at the usual optimal stopping problem. Observe that in
the one player optimal stopping problem the goal is maximization of the payoff and the corresponding
supremum always exists (may be infinite), so only optimal or almost optimal stopping times remain to
be found while in the game version already existence of the game value is the question which should be
resolved first and only then we can look for optimal (saddle point) or almost optimal stopping times of
the players.
Few years later J. Neveu suggested in [83] a very useful generalization of the above setup which turned
out to be more convenient both for further study and for applications. Namely, now the ”permission”
processes were dropped off and the players could stop whenever they want but instead two payoff adapted
processes Xt ≥ Yt were introduced. It was prescribed that if the 1st player stops the game at time s and
the 2nd one at time t then the former pays to the latter the amount Xs or Yt if s ≤ t or s > t, respectively.
If desired we can have virtual ”permission” processes within this setup not by direct regulations but by a
”market economy” tools. Namely, in order to accomplish this it suffices to prescribe very high payment
Xt or a very low (may be negative) payment Yt where we ”forbid” to stop the game by the 1st player or
by the 2nd one, respectively.
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We observe that from a bit different perspective differential games with stopping times were studied
in 1970ies in a series of papers (see [6], [7] and references there). Game versions of optimal stopping of
a Markov process and of a diffusion were considered in [39] and [5], respectively. It seems that the term
”Dynkin game” appeared first in [3].
Israeli or game options were introduced first in [58] though some special callable derivative security
LION was discussed before in [81] in a kind of game framework without any rigorous justification. An
option or a contingent claim is certain contract and an American option enables its buyer (holder) to
exercise it at any time up to the maturity. A game option gives additionally the right to the option seller
(writer, issuer) to cancell it early paying for this a prescribed penalty. The rational behind this provision
comes from an idea that essentially any contract stipulates conditions for a way out so that the financial
market should not be an exception.
The classical approach to pricing of options is based on hedging arguments. Namely, the price is
defined as a minimal initial amount of a self-financing portfolio which can provide protection (hedging)
against any exercising strategy of the option’s buyer. So, somehow heuristically, this leads to the infimum
over the seller’s strategies and to the supremum over the buyer’s strategies, i.e. we arrive at a game type
inf sup representation which still should be rigorously justified.
The structure of this paper is the following. In the next section we briefly survey main results con-
cerning Dynkin’s games. In Section 3 we discuss the up to date research about game options and related
derivative securities. In Sections 4 and 5 we exhibit more special results concerning discrete approxima-
tions of game options and game options in markets with transaction costs, respectively.
2. Dynkin games
The general modern setup for a Dynkin’s game consists of a probability space (Ω,F ,P), of a right
continuous filtration of complete σ-algebras {Ft} and of three {Ft}-adapted stochastic processes Xt, Yt
and Zt so that when the 1st player stops the game at time s and the 2nd one stops at time t then the
former pays to the latter the amount
(2.1) H(s, t) = XsIs<t + YtIs>t + ZtIs=t
where IΓ = 1 if an event Γ occurs and = 0, otherwise. We allow the time t to run either along nonnegative
integers N or along nonnegative reals R+ up to some horizon T ≤ ∞ when the game is stopped and the
1st player pays to the 2nd one the amount
H(T, T ) = XT = YT = ZT
where in the case T =∞ we assume that
(2.2) 0 = X∞ = lim
t→∞
Xt = Y∞ = lim
t→∞
Yt = Z∞ = lim
t→∞
Zt.
In the continuous time case, i.e. when t runs over R+, the processes Xt, Yt and Zt are supposed to be
right continuous.
Next, assume that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
(2.3) Yt ≤ Zt ≤ Xt P− almost surely (a.s) and
(2.4) E sup
0≤t≤T
(|Yt|+ |Zt|+ |Xt|) <∞.
Denote by Ts,t. s ≤ t the collection of all stopping times τ with values between s and t (i.e. nonnegative
random variables such that {τ ≤ u} ∈ Fu for all u). Introduce the upper and the lower values of the
game starting at time t ≤ T by
(2.5) V¯t = ess inf
σ∈TtT
ess sup
τ∈TtT
E
(
H(σ, τ)|Ft
)
and
(2.6) Vt = ess sup
τ∈TtT
ess inf
σ∈TtT
E
(
H(σ, τ)|Ft
)
.
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It turns out that we can choose these processes {V¯t} and {Vt} to be right upper semicontinuous which is
a sufficient regularity in order to proceed here.
Theorem 2.1. Under the above conditions Vτ
def
= V¯τ = Vτ a.s. for any stopping time τ ∈ T0T and, in
particular, the Dynkin’s game has a value
(2.7) V = V0 = V¯0 = V0.
Furthermore, for any ε > 0 the stopping times
(2.8) σε = inf{t ≤ T : Vt ≥ Xt − ε} and τε = inf{t ≤ T : Vt ≤ Yt + ε}
are ε-optimal, i.e. for any σ, τ ∈ T0T ,
(2.9) E
(
H(σε, τ)) − ε ≤ E
(
H(σε, τε)
) ≤ E(H(σ, τε))+ ε.
Under additional regularity conditions (say, Xt, Yt, Zt are continuous stochastic processes) the inequality
(2.9) remains true for ε = 0 with some σ0, τ0, i.e. there exists a saddle point for the Dynkin’s game
above. In the discrete time case we have also the following backward recursive (dynamical programming)
relation
(2.10) Vn = min
(
Xn, max(Yn,E(Vn+1|Fn))
)
.
The theorem above follows from [83], [86], [87] and [77] in the discrete time case and from [73], [98] and
[89] in the continuous time case. Observe that (2.5)–(2.7) and (2.9) imply
|V0 − E
(
H(σε, τε)
)| ≤ ε.
If the condition (2.3) does not hold true then the above game value may not exist (i.e. V¯0 > V0) if the
players are restricted to usual (pure) stopping times and to have the game value they should be allowed
to use randomized stopping times (see [107], [94], [106], [85] and [76]). Other results on Dynkin’s games
leading to randomized stopping times can be found in [28], [29], [42] and [43].
Remark 2.2. We observe that randomized stopping times used in the above mentioned papers in order
to obtain Dynkin’s game value without the condition (2.3) look somewhat different from randomized
stopping times we employ in Section 5 in order to study game options in markets with transaction costs.
Namely, the above papers deal with randomized stopping times having (in the discrete time case) the
form λ(p) = min{n ≥ 0 : An ≤ pn} where p = (p0, p1, ...) is an adapted to the filtration {Fn} process with
pn ∈ [0, 1] for all n and A0, A1, A2, ... is a sequence of independent identically uniformly distributed on
[0, 1] random variables independent of payoff processes. Sometimes, it is assumed additionally (see [94])
that An is Fn+1-measurable and independent of Fn. If W = (W0,W1,W2, ...) is an adapted stochastic
process then we can write
Wλ(p) =
∞∑
n=0
ψnWn where ψn = I{An≤pn}
n−1∏
j=0
I{Aj>pj}.
On the other hand, randomized stopping times employed in Section 5 are determined by an adapted
nonnegative sequence χ = (χ0, χ1, χ2, ...) such that
∑∞
j=0 χj = 1 and for an adapted stochastic process
W as above we writeWχ =
∑∞
n=0 χnWn. Here {χn} is an adapted sequence but not necessarily indicators
of events while the above sequence {ψn} is not adapted (unless the filtration is properly enlarged) and it
consists of indicators of events. Still, with respect to the enlarged filtration λ(p) is a usual (pure) stopping
time while randomized stopping times of Section 5 look rather differently. Nevertheless, it turns out that
these two approaches to randomized stopping times are essentially equivalent if
∏
n≥0(1 − pn) = 0 (see
[102] in the discrete time case and the corresponding discussion in [106] for the continuous time case).
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Among other works on Dynkin’s games we can mention results on non-zero-sum games (see [82], [84], [78]
and [88]), Dynkin’s games with asymmetric information (see [73]), more than 2 person optimal stopping
games (see [112], [79] and [101]), optimal stopping games driven by Markov processes (see [44], [97], [39]
and [40]), Dynkin’s games via backward stochastic differential equations with reflection (see [20], [50] and
[51]) and via Dirichlet forms (see [45]), as well as some other results on Dynkin’s and similar games (see
[108], [90], [91], [55], [69], [92], [9], [10], [11], [41] and [1]).
3. Game options and their shortfall risk
A game (Israeli) option (or contingent claim) studied in [58] is a contract between a writer and a holder
at time t = 0 such that both have the right to exercise at any stopping time before the expiry date T .
If the holder exercises at time t he or she receives the amount Yt ≥ 0 from the writer and if the writer
exercises at time t before the holder he must pay to the holder the amount Xt ≥ Yt so that δt = Xt − Yt
is viewed as a penalty imposed on the writer for cancellation of the contract. If both exercise at the same
time t then the holder may claim Yt and if neither have exercised until the expiry time T then the holder
may claim the amount YT . In short, if the writer will exercise at a stopping time σ ≤ T and the holder
at a stopping time τ ≤ T then the former pays to the latter the amount H(σ, τ) where
(3.1) H(s, t) = XsIs<t + YtIt≤s.
We consider such game options in a standard securities market consisting of a nonrandom component bt
representing the value of a savings account at time t with an interest rate r and of a random component
St representing the stock price at time t. As usual, we view St, t > 0 as a stochastic process on a complete
probability space (Ω,F , P ) and we assume that it generates a right continuous filtration {Ft} and that
the payoff processes Xt and Yt are right continuous processes adapted to this filtration and satisfying the
integrability conditions (2.4).
The classical approach suggests that valuation of options should be based on the notions of a self-
financing portfolio and on hedging. We start with a portfolio strategy pi = {pit}0≤t≤T which is a collection
of pairs pit = (βt, γt) so that the portfolio value Wt at time t equals
Wpit = βtbt + γtSt
where the process (βt, γt), 0 ≤ t ≤ T is supposed to be predictable in the discrete time case and progres-
sively measurable in the continuous time case. A portfolio strategy pi is called self-financing if all changes
in the portfolio value are due to capital gains or losses but not to withdrawal or infusion of funds. This
can be expressed by the relations (see [96]),
bt−1(βt − βt−1) + St−1(γt − γt−1) = 0 for t = 1, 2, ..., T
in the discrete time case and
Wpit =W
pi
0 +
∫ t
0
βudbu +
∫ t
0
γudSu
in the continuous time case. We assume also in the continuous time case that with probability one
∫ T
0
|btβt|dt <∞ and
∫ T
0
(γtSt)
2dt <∞.
A pair (σ, pi) of a stopping time σ ≤ T and a self-financing portfolio strategy pi is called a hedge (against
the game contingent claim) if Wpiσ∧t ≥ H(σ, t) with probability one for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Now the fair price
of the game option is defined as the infimum of capitals x for which there exists a hedge (σ, pi) with
Wpi0 = x. In a complete market (i.e. having a unique martingale measure) this is a widely acceptable fair
price of the option while in an incomplete market or in a market with transaction costs this definition
leads to what is known as superhedging (see [96]).
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Two popular models of complete markets were considered in [58] for pricing of game options. First,
the discrete time CRR binomial model (see [24]) was treated there where the stock price Sk at time k is
equal to
(3.2) Sk = S0
k∏
j=1
(1 + ρj), S0 > 0
where ρj , j = 1, 2, ... are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables such that ρj = b > 0
with probability p > 0 and ρj = a < 0, a > −1 with probability q = 1− p > 0. Secondly, [58] deals with
the continuous time Black-Scholes (BS) market model where the stock price St at time t is given by the
geometric Brownian motion
(3.3) St = S0 exp
(
(α − κ2/2)t+ κBt
)
, S0 > 0
where {Bt}t≥0 is the standard one-dimensional continuous in time Brownian motion (Wiener process)
starting at zero and κ > 0, α ∈ (−∞,∞) are some parameters. In addition to the stock which is a risky
security the market includes in both cases also a savings account with a deterministic growth given by
the formulas
(3.4) bn = (1 + r)
nb0 and bt = b0e
rt, b0, r > 0
in the CRR model (where we assume in addition that r < b) and in the BS model, respectively.
Recall (see [96]) that a probability measure describing the evolution of a stock price in a stochastic
financial market is called martingale (risk-neutral) if the discounted stock prices ((1+r)−kSk in the CRR
model and e−rtSt in the BS model) become martingales. Relying on the above hedging arguments the
following result was proved in [58].
Theorem 3.1. The fair price V of the game option is given by the formulas
(3.5) V = min
σ∈T0T
max
τ∈T0T
E
(
(1 + r)−σ∧τH(σ, τ)
)
in the CRR market (with usual notations a ∧ b = min(a, b), a ∨ b = max(a, b)) and
(3.6) V = inf
σ∈T0T
sup
τ∈T0T
E
(
e−rσ∧τH(σ, τ)
)
in the BS market where the expectations are taken with respect to the corresponding martingale probabil-
ities, which are uniquely defined since these markets are known to be complete (see [96]), T is the expiry
time and Tst is the space of corresponding stopping times with values between s and t taking into account
that in the CRR model σ and τ are allowed to take only integer values.
Observe, that the formulas (3.5) and (3.6) represent also the values of corresponding Dynkin’s (optimal
stopping) games with payoffs (1+ r)−σ∧τH(σ, τ) and e−rσ∧τH(σ, τ), respectively, when the first and the
second players stop the game at stopping times σ and τ , respectively. The continuous time BS model is
generally considered as a better description of the evolution of real stocks, in particular, since the CRR
model allows only two possible values (1 + b)Sk and (1 + a)Sk for the stock price Sk+1 at time k + 1
given its price Sk at time k. The main advantage of the CRR model is its simplicity and the possibility
of easier computations of the value V in (3.5), in particular, by means of the dynamical programming
recursive relations (see [58]),
V = V0,N , VN,N = (1 + r)
−NYN , and(3.7)
Vk,N = min
(
(1 + r)−kXk, max
(
(1 + r)−kYk, E(Vk+1,N |Fk)
))
where a positive integer N is an expiry time and {Fk}k≥0 is the corresponding filtration of σ-algebras. By
this reason it makes sense to study approximations of the BS model by CRR models which we describe
in the next section.
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Recently it became popular to employ game options as a framework for the study of convertible
(callable) bonds (see [66], [99], [48], [103], [68], [17] and [111]). A holder of such bond either does nothing
or decides to convert it into a predetermined number of stocks which can be considered as a cash payment
depending on the current stock price, especially, in a market without transaction costs. On the other
hand, the firm which issued this callable convertible bond may redeem it any time at a call price or force
its conversion into stocks, and so this situation can be treated within the setup of game options.
Several papers deal with computation of the fair price of game options in special situations when the
underlying stock price evolves according to a Markov process which usually, as in the BS model, turns
out to be the geometric Brownian motion and when the payoffs depend only on the current stock price,
usually just for the put and call options payoffs arriving at a study of the free boundary problem with
buyer’s and seller’s exercise boundaries (see [63], [64], [67], [70], [100], [104] and [113]). For other callable
derivative securities which were studied within the game options framework and its generalizations we
refer the reader to [14], [16], [110], [105], [2] and [114].
In real market conditions an investor (seller) may not be willing for various reasons to tie in a hedging
portfolio the full initial capital required for a (perfect) hedge. In this case the seller is ready to accept
a risk that his portfolio value at an excercise time may be less than his obligation to pay and he will
need additional funds to fullfil the contract. Thus a portfolio shortfall comes into the picture and it is
important to estimate the corresponding risk. We consider here a certain type of risk called the shortfall
risk which was defined for game options in [31] by
(3.8) R(x) = inf
(pi,σ)
R(pi, σ) where R(pi, σ) = sup
τ
E
(
(H(σ, τ) − b0Wpiσ∧τ )+/bσ∧τ
)
where the supremum is taken over all self-financing portfolio strategies pi with an initial capital x and both
in infimum and in supremum the stopping times σ and τ do not exceed the option expiration date (horizon)
T . It was shown in [31] that in the discrete time case both the shortfall risk and the corresponding
minimizing portfolio strategies and stopping times could be obtained by means of a backward induction
(dynamical programming) algorithm. In the continuous time case the situation is more complicated. For
the shortfall risk in the American options case [80] obtained existence of minimizing strategies relying
on some convex analysis argument which are not available in the game options case, and so existence of
minimizing portfolio strategies and stopping times in (3.8) remains an open question.
The papers [35] and [52] deal with, so called, swing game options which are, in fact, multiple exercise
game options. This question was studied before for American options in [22] but the option price obtained
there was not justified by classical hedging arguments. This justification was done in [35] and [52]
for multiple exercise game options in the discrete and continuous time cases, respectively, which by
simplification yields the result for American options, as well. This investigation required the study of
Dynkin’s games with multiple stopping which did not appear in the literature before. Observe that
multiple exercise options may appear in their own rights when an investor wants to buy or sell an
underlying security in several instalments at times of his choosing and, actually, any usual American
or game option can be naturally extended to the multi exercise setup so that they may emerge both
in commodities, energy and in different financial markets. Suppose, for instance, that a European car
producer (having most expenses in euros or pounds) plans to supply autos to US during a year in
several shipments and it buys a multiple exercise option which guaranties a favorable dollar–euro or
pund exchange rate at time of shipments (of its choosing). The seller of such option can use currencies
as underlying for his hedging portfolio. A multiple exercise option could be cheaper then a basket of
usual one exercise options if the former stipulates certain delay time between exercises which is quite
natural in the above example. Furthermore, the acting sides above may prefer to deal with game rather
than American multiple exercise options since the former is cheaper for the buyer and safer (because of
cancellation clause) for the seller.
Next, we describe more precisely game swing (multiple exercise) options in the CRR market where
the stock price evolves according to (3.2). We consider a swing option of the game type which has the
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i-th payoff, i ≥ 1 having the form
(3.9) H(i)(m,n) = Xi(m)Im<n + Yi(n)In≤m, ∀m,n
where Xi(n), Yi(n) are Fn-adapted and 0 ≤ Yi(n) ≤ Xi(n) <∞. Thus for any i, n there exist functions
f
(i)
n , g
(i)
n : {a, b}n → R+ such that
(3.10) Yi(n) = f
(i)
n (ρ1, ..., ρn), Xi(n) = g
(i)
n (ρ1, ..., ρn).
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ L− 1 let Ci be the set of all pairs ((a1, ..., ai), (d1, ..., di)) ∈ {0, ..., N}i × {0, 1}i such
that aj+1 ≥ N ∧ (aj + 1) for any j < i. Such sequences represent the history of payoffs up to the i-th
one in the following way. If aj = k and dj = 1 then the seller canceled the j-th claim at the moment k
and if dj = 0 then the buyer exercised the j-th claim at the moment k (maybe together with the seller).
For n ≥ 1 denote by Γn the set of all stopping times with respect to the filtration {Fn}Nn=0 with values
from n to N and set Γ = Γ0.
Definition 3.2. A stopping strategy is a sequence s = (s1, ..., sL) such that s1 ∈ Γ is a stopping time
and for i > 1, si : Ci−1 → Γ is a map which satisfies si((a1, ..., ai−1), (d1, ..., di−1)) ∈ ΓN∧(1+ai−1).
In other words for the i-th payoff both the seller and the buyer choose stopping times taking into
account the history of payoffs so far. Denote by S the set of all stopping strategies and define the map
F : S × S → ΓL × ΓL by F (s, b) = ((σ1, ..., σL), (τ1, ..., τL)) where σ1 = s1, τ1 = b1 and for i > 1,
σi = si((σ1 ∧ τ1, ..., σi−1 ∧ τi−1), (Iσ1<τ1 , ..., Iσi−1<τi−1)) and
τi = bi((σ1 ∧ τ1, ..., σi−1 ∧ τi−1), (Iσ1<τ1 , ..., Iσi−1<τi−1)).
Set
ck(s, b) =
L∑
i=1
Iσi∧τi≤k
which is a random variable equal to the number of payoffs until the moment k.
For swing options the notion of a self financing portfolio involves not only allocation of capital between
stocks and the bank account but also payoffs at exercise times. At the time k the writer’s decision how
much money to invest in stocks (while depositing the remaining money into a bank account) depends not
only on his present portfolio value but also on the current claim. Denote by Ξ the set of functions on the
(finite) probability space Ω.
Definition 3.3. A portfolio strategy with an initial capital x > 0 is a pair pi = (x, γ) where γ :
{0, ..., N − 1} × {1, ..., L} × R → Ξ is a map such that γ(k, i, y) is an Fk-measurable random variable
which represents the number of stocks which the seller buys at the moment k provided that the current
claim has the number i and the present portfolio value is y. At the same time the sum y− γ(k, i, y)Sk is
deposited to the bank account of the portfolio. We call a portfolio strategy pi = (x, γ) admissible if for
any y ≥ 0,
(3.11) − y
Skb
≤ γ(k, i, y) ≤ − y
Ska
.
For any y ≥ 0 denote K(y) = [− yb ,− ya ].
Notice that if the portfolio value at the moment k is y ≥ 0 then the portfolio value at the moment
k+1 before the payoffs (if there are any payoffs at this time) is given by y+ γ(k, i, y)Sk(
Sk+1
Sk
− 1) where
i is the number of the next payoff. In view of independency of
Sk+1
Sk
− 1 and γ(k, i, y)Sk we conclude
that the inequality (3.11) is equivalent to the inequality y + γ(k, i, y)Sk(
Sk+1
Sk
− 1) ≥ 0, i.e. the portfolio
value at the moment k+1 before the payoffs is nonnegative. Denote by A(x) be the set of all admissible
portfolio strategies with an initial capital x > 0. Denote A = ⋃x>0A(x). Let pi = (x, γ) be a portfolio
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strategy and s, b ∈ S. Set ((σ1, ..., σL), (τ1, ..., τL)) = F (s, b) and ck = ck(s, b). The portfolio value at the
moment k after the payoffs (if there are any payoffs at this moment) is given by
W
(pi,s,b)
0 = x−H(1)(σ1, τ1)Iσ1∧τ1=0 and for k > 0,(3.12)
W
(pi,s,b)
k =W
(pi,s,b)
k−1 + Ick−1<L[γ(k − 1, ck−1 + 1,W (pi,s,b)k−1 )(Sk − Sk−1)−∑L
i=1H
(i)(σi, τi)Iσi∧τi=k].
Definition 3.4. A (perfect) hedge is a pair (pi, s) which consists of a portfolio strategy and a stopping
strategy such that W
(pi,s,b)
k ≥ 0 for any b ∈ S and k ≤ N .
As usual, the option price V ∗ is defined as the infimum of W ≥ 0 such that there exists a hedge with
an initial capital W . The following result from [35] provides a dynamical programming algorithm for
computation of both the option price and the corresponding hedge.
Theorem 3.5. For any n ≤ N set
(3.13) X(1)n = XL(n), Y
(1)
n = YL(n) and V
(1)
n = min
σ∈Γn
max
τ∈Γn
E˜(H(L)(σ, τ)|Fn)
and for 1 < k ≤ L,
X
(k)
n = XL−k+1(n) + E˜(V
(k−1)
(n+1)∧N |Fn),(3.14)
Y
(k)
n = YL−k+1(n) + E˜(V
(k−1)
(n+1)∧N |Fn) and
V
(k)
n = minσ∈Γn maxτ∈Γn E˜(X
(k)
σ Iσ<τ + Y
(k)
τ Iσ≥τ |Fn)
Where E˜ is the expectation with respect to the unique martingale measure. Then
(3.15) V ∗ = V
(L)
0 = min
s∈S
max
b∈S
G(s, b)
where G(s, b) = E˜
∑L
i=1H
(i)(σi, τi) and ((σ1, ..., σL), (τ1, ..., τL)) = F (s, b). Furthermore, the stopping
strategies s∗ = (s∗1, ..., s
∗
L) ∈ S and b = (b∗1, ..., b∗L) given by
s∗1 = N ∧min {k|X(L)k = V (L)k }, b∗1 = min {k|Y (L)k = V (L)k },(3.16)
s∗i ((a1, ..., ai−1), (d1, ..., di−1)) = N ∧min {k > ai−1|
X
(L−i+1)
k = V
(L−i+1)
k }, b∗i ((a1, ..., ai−1), (d1, ..., di−1))
= N ∧min {k > ai−1|Y (L−i+1)k = V (L−i+1)k }, i > 1
satisfy the saddle point inequalities
(3.17) G(s∗, b) ≤ G(s∗, b∗) ≤ G(s, b∗) for all s, b
and there exists a portfolio strategy pi∗ ∈ A(V (L)0 ) such that (pi∗, s∗) is a hedge.
4. Approximations of game options and of their shortfall risk
Following [59] we will consider here approximations of the BS model by a sequence of CRR models
with the interest rates r = r(n) from (3.4) and with random variables ρk = ρ
(n)
k from (3.2) given by
(4.1) r = r(n) = exp(rT/n)− 1 and ρk = ρ(n)k = exp
(rT
n
+ κ(
T
n
)1/2ξk
)− 1
where ξj = ξ
(n)
j , j = 1, 2, ... are i.i.d. random variables taking on the values 1 and −1 with probabilities
p(n) = (exp(κ
√
T
n ) + 1)
−1 and 1 − p(n) = (exp(−κ
√
T
n ) + 1)
−1, respectively. This choice of random
variables ξi, i ∈ N determines already the probability measures P ξn = {p(n), 1 − p(n)}∞ for the above
sequence of CRR models and since Eξnρ
(n)
k = r
(n), where Eξn is the expectation with respect to P
ξ
n ,
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we conclude that P ξn is the martingale measure for the corresponding CRR market and the fair price
V = V (n) of a game option in this market is given by the formula (3.5) with E = Eξn.
Let V be the fair price of the game option in the BS market. It turns out that for a certain natural
class of payoffs Xt and Yt which may depend on the whole path (history) of the stock price evolution (as
in integral or Russian type options) the error |V − V (n)| does not exceed Cn−1/4(lnn)3/4 where C > 0
does not depend on n and it can be estimated explicitly. Moreover, we will see that the rational exercise
times of our CRR binomial approximations yield near rational (Cn−1/4(lnn)3/4-optimal stopping times
for the corresponding Dynkin games) exercise times for game options in the BS market. Since the values
V (n) and the optimal stopping times of the corresponding discrete time Dynkin’s games can be obtained
directly via the dynamical programming recursive procedure (3.7) our results provide a justification of
a rather effective method of computation of fair prices and exercise times of game options with path
dependent payoffs. The standard construction of a self-financing hedging portfolio involves usually the
Doob–Meyer decomposition of supermartingales which is explicit only in the discrete but not in the
continuous time case. We will see how to construct a self-financing portfolio in the BS market with a
small average (maximal) shortfall and an initial capital close to the fair price of a game option using
hedging self-financing portfolios for the approximating binomial CRR markets. The latter problem does
not seem to have been addressed before [59] in the literature on this subject. This hints, in particular,
that since hedging self-financing portfolio strategies can be computed only approximately their possible
shortfalls come naturally into the picture and they should be taken into account in option pricing even if
a perfect hedging exists theoretically. Note that these results require not only an approximation of stock
prices and the corresponding payoffs but also we have to take care about the different nature of stopping
times in (3.5) and (3.6).
The main tool here is the Skorokhod type embedding (see [4]) of sums of i.i.d. random variables into
a Brownian motion (with a constant drift, in this case). This tool was already employed for similar
purposes in [75] and in [115]. The first paper treats an optimal stopping problem which can be applied
to an American style option with a payoff function depending only on the current stock price and, more
importantly, this function must be bounded and have two bounded derivatives which excludes usual put
and call options cases. The second paper deals only with European options and, again, only payoffs
(though with some discontinuities) determined by the current stock price are allowed. We observe that
the Skorokhod embedding does not provide optimal error estimates in strong approximation theorems and
it would be interesting to understand whether other approaches such as the quantile method (see [116])
and Stein’s method (see [18]) can be employed for approximation of optimal stopping game values with
better estimates of errors. Skorokhod embedding does not work also in the multidimensional situation
and for this case another method from [34] was employed in [60] where, actually, more general and not
only binomial approximations were considered. More general approximation results for game options
were obtained in [25] where only continuity of payoffs were assumed but as a result no error estimates
could be obtained there.
For each t > 0 denote by M [0, t] the space of Borel measurable functions on [0, t] with the uniform
metric d0t(υ, υ˜) = sup0≤s≤t |υs − υ˜s|. For each t > 0 let Ft and ∆t be nonnegative functions on M [0, t]
such that for some constant L ≥ 1 and for any t ≥ s ≥ 0 and υ, υ˜ ∈M [0, t],
(4.2) |Fs(υ)− Fs(υ˜)|+ |∆s(υ)−∆s(υ˜)| ≤ L(s+ 1)d0s(υ, υ˜),
and
(4.3) |Ft(υ)− Fs(υ)|+ |∆t(υ)−∆s(υ)| ≤ L
(|t− s|(1 + sup
u∈[0,t]
|υu|) + sup
u∈[s,t]
|υu − υs|
)
.
By (4.2), F0(υ) = F0(υ0) and ∆0(υ) = ∆0(υ0) are functions of υ0 only. By (4.3),
(4.4) Ft(υ) + ∆t(υ) ≤ F0(υ0) + ∆0(υ0) + L(t+ 2)(1 + sup
0≤s≤t
|υs|)
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Next, we consider the BS market on a complete probability space together with its martingale measure
PB which exists and is unique as a corollary of the Girsanov theorem (see [96]). Let Bt, t ≥ 0 be the
standard one-dimensional continuous in time Brownian motion with respect to the martingale measure
PB. Set
B∗t = −
κ
2
t+Bt, t ≥ 0.
Then the stock price SBt (z) at time t in the BS market can be written in the form
(4.5) SBt (z) = z exp(rt+ κB
∗
t ), S
B
0 (z) = z > 0,
where r > 0 is the interest rate and κ > 0 is the, so called, volatility. We will consider game options in
the BS market with payoff processes in the form
Yt = Ft(S
B(z)) and Xt = Gt(S
B(z)), t ∈ [0, T ], T > 0,
where Gt = Ft + ∆t, F,∆ satisfy (4.2) and (4.3), S
B(z) = SB(z, ω) ∈ M [0, T ] is a random function
taking the value SBt (z) = S
B
t (z, ω) at t ∈ [0, T ], and in the notations Ft(SB(z)) Gt(SB(z)) for t < T we
take the restriction of SB(z) to the interval [0, t]. The fair price V = V (z) of this option with an initial
value z > 0 of the stock is given by (3.6).
Next, we consider a sequence of CRR markets on a complete probability space such that for each
n = 1, 2, ... the stock prices S
(n)
t (z) at time t are given by the formula
S
(n)
t (z) = z exp
(∑[nt/T ]
k=1
(
rT
n + κ(
T
n )
1/2ξk
))
, t ≥ T/n(4.6)
and S
(n)
t (z) = S
(n)
0 (z) = z > 0, t ∈ [0, T/n)
where, recall, ξ1, ξ2, ... are i.i.d. random variables taking the values 1 and −1 with probabilities p(n) =
(exp(κ
√
T
n ) + 1)
−1 and 1− p(n) = (exp(−κ
√
T
n ) + 1)
−1, respectively. Namely, we consider CRR markets
where stock prices Sm = S
(n)
m
n
(z), m = 0, 1, 2, ... satisfy (3.2) with ρk = ρ
n
k given by (4.1) and, in
addition, in place of the interest rate r in the first formula in (3.4) we take the sequence of interest rates
rn = exp(rT/n)−1 where r is the interest rate of the BS market appearing in the second formula of (3.4)
and in (3.6). We consider S(n)(z) = S(n)(z, ω) as a random function on [0, T ], so that S(n)(z, ω) ∈M [0, T ]
takes the value S
(n)
t (z) = S
(n)
t (z, ω) at t ∈ [0, T ]. For k = 0, 1, 2, ..., n put
(4.7) Yk = Y
(n)
k (z) = F kTn
(S(n)(z)) and Xk = X
(n)
k (z) = G kTn
(S(n)(z)).
Then for each n the fair price V = V (n)(z) of the game option in the corresponding CRR market with
an initial value z > 0 of the stock is given by (3.5).
Set
(4.8) HBz (s, t) = Ft(S
B(z))Is≥t +Gs(S
B(z))Is<t and, Q
B
z (s, t) = e
−rs∧tRBz (s, t) and
(4.9) H(n)z (s, t) = Ft(S
(n)(z))Is≥t +Gs(S
(n)(z))Is<t, Q
(n)
z (s, t) = e
−rs∧tR(n)z (s, t).
Denote by T B0T and T ξ0n the sets of stopping times with respect to the Brownian filtration FBt , t ≥ 0 with
values in [0, T ] and with respect to the filtration Fξk = σ{ξ1, ..., ξk} with values in {0, 1, ..., n}. Set
(4.10) V (z) = inf
σ∈T B0T
sup
τ∈T B0T
EBQBz (σ, τ) and
(4.11) V (n)(z) = min
ζ∈T ξ0n
max
η∈T ξ0n
EξnQ
(n)
z (
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
).
where EB and Eξn are the expectations with respect to the probability measures P
B and P ξn , respectively,
and we observe that T ξ0n is finite set so that we can use min and max in (4.11).
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Recall, that we choose PB to be the martingale measure for the BS market and observe that P ξn
is the martingale measure for the corresponding CRR market since a direct computation shows that
Eξnρ
(n)
k = rn. Thus, (4.10) and (4.11) give fair prices of the game options in the corresponding markets.
We note also that all our formulas involving the expectations EB, in particular, (4.10) giving the fair price
V of a game option, do not depend on a particular choice of a continuous in time version of the Brownian
motion since all of them induce the same probability measure on the space of continuous sample paths
which already determines all expressions with the expectations EB appearing in this paper.
The following result from [32] provides an estimate for the error term in approximation of the fair price
of a game option in the BS market by fair prices of the sequence of game options and prices of Dynkin’s
games defined above.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that V (z) and V (n)(z) are defined by (4.9)–(4.11) with functions F and G =
F +∆ satisfying (4.2) and (4.3). Then there exists a constant C > 0 (which can be explicitly estimated)
such that
(4.12) |V (z)− V (n)(z)| ≤ C(F0(z) + ∆0(z) + z + 1)n− 14 (lnn)3/4
for all z, n > 0.
We can choose more general i.i.d. random variables ξ1, ξ2, ... appearing in the definition of V
(n), as
well, but these generalizations do not seem to have a financial mathematics motivation since we want
to approximate game options in the BS market by simplest possible models which are, of course, game
options in the CRR market.
Among main examples of options with path-dependent payoff we have in mind integral options where
Ft(υ) = (
∫ t
0
fu(υu)du− L)+ (call option case)
or
Ft(υ) = (L−
∫ t
0
fu(υu)du)
+ (put option case)
where, as usual, a+ = max(a, 0). The penalty functional may also have here the integral form
∆t(υ) =
∫ t
0
δu(υu)du.
In order to satisfy the conditions (4.2) and (4.3) we can assume that for some K > 0 and all x, y, u,
|fu(x)− fu(y)|+ |δu(x)− δu(y)| ≤ K|x− y|
and
|fu(x)|+ |δu(x)| ≤ K|x|.
Observe, also that the Asian type (averaged integral) payoffs of the form
Ft(υ) = (
1
t
∫ t
0
fu(υu)du − L)+ or = (L− 1
t
∫ t
0
fu(υu)du)
+
do not satisfy the condition (4.3) if arbitrarily small exercise times are allowed though the latter seems
to have only some theoretical interest as it hardly happens in reality. Still, also in this case the binomial
approximation errors can be estimated in a similar way considering separately estimates for small stopping
times and for stopping times bounded away from zero. Namely, define Vε(z) and V
(n)
ε (z) for ε ≥ 0 by
(4.10) and (4.11) where Q
(B)
z (σ, τ) and Q
(n)
z (
ζT
n ,
ηT
n ) are replaced by Q
(B)
z (σ ∨ ε, τ ∨ ε) and Q(n)z ( ζTn ∨
ε, ηTn ∨ ε), respectively. Assuming that fu and δu are Lipschitz continuous also in u (at least for u close
to 0) in the form |fs(x) − fu(x)| + |δs(x) − δu(x)| ≤ K(x + 1)|s − u| for some K > 0 and all s, u, x ≥ 0
we obtain that if υ0 = z and F0(υ) = (f0(z)− L)+ or = (L− f0(z))+ then
|Fs(υ)− F0(z)| ≤ Ks(1 + sup
0≤u≤s
|υu|) +K sup
0≤u≤s
|υu − z|.
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It is not difficult to see from here that |V (z)− Vε(z)| and |V (n)(z)− V (n)ε (z)| do not exceed C(1 + z)√ε
for all small ε and some constant C. On the other hand, similarly to Theorem 4.1 we see that for some
constant C > 0 and all n, ε > 0,
|Vε(z)− V (n)ε (z)| ≤ C(1 + z)ε−1n−1/4(lnn)3/4.
Choosing ε = n−1/6
√
lnn we obtain that under the above conditions in the case of Asian options |V (z)−
V (n)(z)| can be estimated by 3C(1 + z)n−1/12(lnn)1/4.
Another important example of path-dependent payoffs are, so called, Russian options where, for in-
stance,
Ft(υ) = max
(
m, sup
u∈[0,t]
υu
)
and ∆t(υ) = δυt.
Such payoffs satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4.1. Indeed, (4.2) is clear in this case and (4.3) follows
since for t ≥ s,
max(m, supu∈[0,t] vu)−max(m, supu∈[0,s] vu) ≤ supu∈[0,t] vu − supu∈[0,s] vu
≤ supu∈[s,t] vu − vs ≤ supu∈[s,t] |vu − vs|.
In order to compare V (z) and V (n)(z) in the case of path dependent payoffs we have to consider both
BS and CRR markets on one probability space in an appropriate way and the main tool in achieving
this goal will be here the Skorokhod type embedding (see, for instance, [4], Section 37). In fact, for the
binomial i.i.d. random variables ξ1, ξ2, ... appearing in the setup of the CRR market models above the
embedding is explicit and no general theorems are required but if we want to extend the result for other
sequences of i.i.d. random variables we have to rely upon the general result. Namely, define recursively
θ
(n)
0 = 0, θ
(n)
k+1 = inf{t > θ(n)k : |B∗t −B∗θ(n)k | =
√
T
n
},
where, recall, B∗t = −κ2 t+Bt. The standard strong Markov property based arguments (cf. [4], Section 37)
show that θ
(n)
k −θ(n)k−1, k = 1, 2, ... are i.i.d. sequences of random variables such that (θ(n)k+1−θ(n)k , B∗θ(n)
k+1
−
B∗
θ
(n)
k
) are independent of FB
θ
(n)
k
(where, recall, FBt = σ{Bs, s ≤ t}).
It turns out (see [115] and [59]) that B∗
θ
(n)
1
has the same distribution as
√
T
n ξ1. Set
(4.13) Ξ
(n)
k = (
T
n
)1/2
k∑
j=1
ξj ,
then Ξ
(n)
k has the same distribution as B
∗
θ
(n)
k
.
Theorem 4.1 provides an approximation of the fair price of game options in the BS market by means
of fair prices of game options in the CRR market which becomes especially useful if we can provide also a
simple description of rational (or δ-rational) excercise times of these options in the BS market via exercise
times of their CRR market approximations which are, by the definition, optimal (or δ-optimal) stopping
times for the Dynkin game whose price is given by (4.11). For each k = 1, 2, ... introduce the finite σ-
algebra GB,nk = σ{B∗θ(n)1 , B
∗
θ
(n)
2
−B∗
θ
(n)
1
, ..., B∗
θ
(n)
k
−B∗
θ
(n)
k−1
} which is, clearly, isomorphic to Fξk = σ{ξi, i ≤ k}
considered before since each element of GB,nk and of Fξk is an event of the form
AB,n
ι(k)
= {B∗
θ
(n)
j
−B∗
θ
(n)
j−1
= ιj
√
T
n
, j = 1, ..., k}
and
Aξ
ι(k)
= {ξj = ιj , j = 1, ...k},
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respectively, where ι(k) = (ι1, ..., ιk) ∈ {−1, 1}k, θ(n)0 = 0 and B0 = 0. Let SB,n be the set of stopping
times with respect to the filtration GB,nk , k = 0, 1, 2, ..., where GB,n0 = {∅,ΩB} is the trivial σ-algebra
and ΩB is the sample space of the Brownian motion. The subset of these stopping times with values
in {0, 1, ..., n} will be denoted by SB,n0,n . For each ι(n) = (ι1, ..., ιn) ∈ {−1, 1}n and k < n we set
ι(k) = (ι1, ..., ιk) ∈ {−1, 1}k. Denote by J0,n the set of functions ν : {−1, 1}n → {0, 1, ..., n} such that if
ν(ι(n)) = k ≤ n and ι˜(k) = ι(k) for some ι˜(n) ∈ {−1, 1}n then ν(ι˜(n)) = k, as well. Define the functions
λ
(n)
ξ : Ωξ → {−1, 1}n and λ(n)B : ΩB → {−1, 1}n by λ(n)ξ (ω) = (ξ1(ω), ..., ξn(ω)) and
λ
(n)
B (ω) =
√
n
T
(
B∗
θ
(n)
1 (ω)
(ω), B∗
θ
(n)
2 (ω)
(ω)−B∗
θ
(n)
1 (ω)
(ω), ..., B∗
θ
(n)
n (ω)
(ω)−B∗
θ
(n)
n−1(ω)
(ω)
)
where Ωξ and ΩB are sample spaces on which the sequence ξ1, ξ2, ... and the Brownian motion Bt are
defined, respectively. It is clear that any ζ ∈ T ξ0n and η ∈ SB,n0,n can be represented uniquely in the form
ζ = µ ◦ λ(n)ξ and η = ν ◦ λ(n)B for some µ, ν ∈ J0,n.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a constant C > 0 (which can be estimated explicitly) such that if ζ∗n = µ
∗
n◦λ(n)ξ
and η∗n = ν
∗
n ◦ λ(n)ξ , µ∗n, ν∗n ∈ J0n are rational exercise times for the game option in the CRR market
defined by (4.6), i.e.
(4.14) V (n)(z) = min
ζ∈T ξ0n
EξQ(n)z (ζ
T
n
, η∗n
T
n
) = max
η∈T ξ0n
EξQ(n)z (ζ
∗
n
T
n
, η
T
n
)
then ϕ∗n = θ
(n)
µ∗n◦λ
(n)
B
and ψ∗n = θ
(n)
ν∗n◦λ
(n)
B
are δn(z)-rational exercise times for the game option in the BS
market defined by (4.4) and (4.5), i.e.
(4.15) sup
τ∈T B0T
EBQBz (ϕ
∗
n, τ)− δn(z) ≤ V (z) ≤ inf
σ∈T B0T
EBQBz (σ, ψ
∗
n) + δn(z),
where δn(z) = C(F0(z) + ∆0(z) + z + 1)n
− 14 (lnn)3/4.
It is well known (see, for instance, [83]) that when payoffs depend only on the current stock price
(a Markov case) δ-optimal stopping times of Dynkin’s games can be obtained as first arrival times to
domains where the payoff is δ-close to the value of the game (as a function of the initial stock price).
For path dependent payoffs the situation is more complicated and, in general, in order to construct δ-
optimal stopping times we have to know the stochastic process of values of the games starting at each
time t ∈ [0, T ] conditioned to the information up to t. It is not clear what kind of approximation of
this process can provide some information about δ-rational exercise times and the convenient alternative
method of their construction exhibited in Theorem 4.2 seems to be important both for the theory and
applications. Moreover, this construction is effective and can be employed in practice since µ∗n and ν
∗
n
are functions on sequences of 1’s and −1’s which can be computed (and stored in a computer) using the
recursive formulas (3.7) even before the stock evolution begins. In order to compute λ
(n)
B we have to
watch the discounted stock price SˇBt (z) = e
−rtSBt (z) evolution of a real stock at moments θ
(n)
k which are
obtained recursively by θ
(n)
0 = 0 and
(4.16) θ
(n)
k+1 = inf{t > θ(n)k : SˇBt (z) = e±κ(
T
n )
1/2
SˇB
θ
(n)
k
(z)}
and to construct the {1,−1} sequence λ(n)B (ω) by writing 1 or −1 on kth place depending on whether
SˇB
θ
(n)
k
(z) = eκ(
T
n )
1/2
SˇB
θ
(n)
k−1
(z) or SˇB
θ
(n)
k
(z) = e−κ(
T
n )
1/2
SˇB
θ
(n)
k−1
(z), respectively.
Recall (see [96]), that a sequence pi = (pi1, ..., pin) of pairs pik = (βk, γk) of Fξk−1-measurable random
variables βk, γk, k = 1, ..., n is called a self-financing portfolio strategy in the CRR market determined
14 Y. Kifer
by (3.2), (3.4), (4.1) and (4.6) if the price of the portfolio at time k is given by the formula
(4.17) Wpi,nk = βkbk + γkS
(n)
kT
n
(z) = βk+1bk + γk+1S
(n)
kT
n
(z)
and the latter equality means that all changes in the portfolio value are due to capital gains and losses
but not to withdrawal or infusion of funds. A pair (ζ, pi) of a stopping time ζ ∈ T ξ0n and a self-financing
portfolio strategy pi is called a hedge for (against) the game option with the payoff R
(n)
z given by (4.9) if
(see [58]),
(4.18) Wpi,nζ∧k ≥ H(n)z (
ζT
n
,
kT
n
), ∀k = 0, 1, ..., n.
It follows from [58] that for any ζ ∈ T ξ0n there exists a self-financing portfolio strategy piζ so that (ζ, piζ) is
a hedge. In particular, if we take the rational exercise time ζ = ζ∗n of the writer then such pi
ζ exists with
the initial portfolio capital V (n)(z). The construction of piζ goes directly via the Doob decomposition
of supermartingales and a martingale representation lemma (see [96] and [58]) both being explicit in
the CRR market case. In the continuous time BS market we cannot write the corresponding portfolio
strategies in an explicit way, and so some approximations are necessary.
Theorem 4.3. Let ζ ∈ T ξ0n, pi = piζ and (4.17) together with (4.18) hold true with Fξk-measurable
βk = β
ζ
k and γk = γ
ξ
k, so that (ζ, pi
ζ) is a hedge. Then βζk = fk ◦λ(k−1)ξ , γζk = gk ◦λ(k−1)ξ , and ζ = µ◦λ(n)ξ
for some uniquely defined functions fk, gk on {−1, 1}k−1 and some µ ∈ J0n. Let ϕ = µ ◦ λ(n)B and set
βϕt = fk ◦ λ(k−1)B and γϕt = gk ◦ λ(k−1)B whenever t ∈ (θ(n)k−1, θ(n)k ]. Then
(4.19) WBt = β
ϕ
t bt + γ
ϕ
t S
B
t (z)
is a self-financing portfolio in the BS market and there exists a constant C > 0 such that
(4.20) EB sup
0≤t≤T
(
HBz (θ
(n)
ϕ , t)−WBθ(n)ϕ ∧t
)+ ≤ C(F0(z) + ∆0(z) + z + 1)n− 14 (lnn)3/4
where a+ = max(a, 0). In particular, there exists a self-financing portfolio of this form satisfying (4.20)
with the initial value V (n)(z) (which according to (4.12) is close to the fair price V (z) of the game option)
taking ϕ∗ = µ∗ ◦ λ(n)B if ζ∗ = µ∗ ◦ λ(n)ξ is the rational exercise time and pi = piζ
∗
is the corresponding
optimal self-financing hedging portfolio strategy for the CRR market.
The inequality (4.20) estimates the expectation of the maximal shortfall (risk) of certain (nearly hedg-
ing) portfolio strategy which can be constructed effectively in applications since the functions fl, gl, and µ
are determined by a self-financing hedging strategy in the CRR market which can be computed directly
and stored in a computer even before the real stock evolution begins or in case of computer memory
limitations we can compute these functions each time when needed using corresponding algorithms for
the CRR market. The functions λ
(n)
B or, in other words, the sequences from {−1, 1}n which should be
pluged into the functions fl, gl, and µ should be obtained in practice by watching the evolution of the
discounted stock price e−rtSBt at moments θ
(n)
k as described after Theorem 4.2.
The paper [32] studied approximations of the shortfall risk R(x) given by (3.8) for game options in the
BS market by the shortfall risks Rn(x) of game options in the sequence of CRR markets defined above
where the initial capital x of all portfolios under consideration is kept the same and the payoffs satisfy
the same conditions as above. The convergence limn→∞Rn(x) = R(x) was proved in [32] but only the
one sided error estimate
R(x) ≤ Rn(x) + Cn−1/4(lnn)3/4
was obtained there for game options while relying on some convexity arguments it was possible to obtain
for American options two sided estimates with the same error term.
In [33] similar approximation results as above were extended to barrier game options. Namely, [33] deals
with double knock–out barrier option with two constant barriers L,R such that 0 ≤ L < S0 < R ≤ ∞
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which means that the option becomes worthless to its holder (buyer) at the first time τI the stock price
St exits the open interval I = (L,R). Thus for t ≥ τ(L,R) the payoff is Xt = Yt = 0. For t < τ(L,R) path
dependent payoffs satisfying (4.3) and (4.4) are considered. Such a contract is of potential value to a
buyer who believes that the stock price will not exit the interval I up to a maturity date and to a seller
who does not want to worry about hedging if the stock price will reach one of the barriers L,R. Such an
option is equivalent to the usual game option when the payoffs Xt and Yt are replaced by X
I
t = XtIt<τI
and Y It = YtIt<τI , respectively. Now, these new payoffs loose regularity conditions (4.3) and (4.4) but
still it turns out that the error estimates in (4.12) remain true when we approximate the price of the
above barrier game options in the BS market by the prices of corresponding barrier game options in
the CRR markets as in Theorem 4.1 above. The results concerning approximation of the shortfall risk
turn out to be very similar for barrier game options as the corresponding results for usual game options
described above.
When payoffs depend only on the current stock price (and not path dependent as in (4.8) and (4.9))
then in some special cases it is possible to obtain better then in Theorem 4.1 error estimates for binomial
approximations of prices of game options relying on partial differential equations methods in the free
boundary problem. In [72] this was done for American put options in the BS market and in [53] this
was extended to game put options with error estimates of order n−1/2 in comparison to n−1/4(lnn)3/4
obtained in Theorem 4.1.
5. Incomplete markets and transaction costs
Both in incomplete markets and in markets with transaction costs there is no one arbitrage free price of
each derivative which can be considered as its fair price and one of approaches in these circomstances is to
study superhedging. Game options in incomplete markets were studied in several papers, in particular,
in [62] they were studied from the point of view of utility maximization which leads to non-zero-sum
Dynkin’s games while in [65]) they were studied from the point of view of superhedging and arbitrage
free prices.
Next, we concentrate in this section in the superhedging pricing of game options in discrete markets
with transactions costs. The market model here will consists of a finite probability space Ω with the
σ-field F = 2Ω of all subspaces of Ω and a probability measure P on F giving a positive weight P(ω)
to each ω ∈ Ω. The setup includes also a filtration {∅,Ω} = F0 ⊂ F1 ⊂ ... ⊂ FT = F where T is a
positive integer called the time horizon. It is convenient to denote by Ωt the set of atoms in Ft so that
any Ft-measurable random variable (vector) Z can be identified with a function (vector function) defined
on Ωt and its value at µ ∈ Ωt will be denoted either by Z(µ) or by Zµ.
The market model consists of a risk-free bond and a risky stock. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that all prices are discounted so that the bond price equals 1 all the time and a position in bonds
is identified with cash holding. On the other hand, the shares of the stock can be traded which involves
proportional transaction costs. This will be represented by bid-ask spreads, i.e. shares can be bought at
an ask price Sat or sold at the bid price S
b
t , where S
s
t ≥ Sbt > 0, t = 0, 1, ..., T are processes adapted to
the filtration {Ft}Tt=o.
The liquidation value at time t of a portfolio (γ, δ) consisting of an amount γ of cash (or bond) and δ
shares of the stock equals
(5.1) θt(γ, δ) = γ + S
b
t δ
+ − Sat δ−
which in case δ < 0 means that a potfolio owner should spend the amount Sat δ
− in order to close his
short position. Observe that fractional numbers of shares are allowed here so that both γ and δ in a
portfolio (γ, δ) could be, in priciple, any real numbers. By definition, a self-financing portfolio strategy is
a predictable process (αt, βt) representing positions in cash (or bonds) and stock at time t, t = 0, 1, ..., T
such that
(5.2) θt(αt − αt+1, βt − βt+1) ≥ 0 ∀t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1
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and the set of all such portfolio strategies will be denoted by Φ.
As before, we consider here a game option which is a contract between its seller and buyer such that
both have the right to exercise it at any time up to a maturity date (horizon) T . In the presence of
transaction costs there is a difference whether we stipulate that the option to be settled in cash or both
in cash and shares of stock while in the former case an assumption concerning transaction costs in the
process of portfolio liquidation should be made. We adopt here the setup where the payments Xt and Yt
are made both in cash and in shares of the stock and transaction costs take place always when a portfolio
adjustment occurs. Thus, the payments are, in fact, adapted random 2-vectors Xt = (X
(1)
t , X
(2)
t ) and
Yt = (Y
(1)
t , Y
(2)
t ) where the first and the second coordinates represent, respectively, a cash amount to be
payed and a number of stock shares to be delivered and as we allow also fractional numbers of shares
both coordinates can take on any nonnegative real value. The inequality Xt ≥ Yt in the zero transaction
costs case is replaced in our present setup by
(5.3) ∆t = θt(X
(1)
t − Y (1)t , X(2)t − Y (2)t ) ≥ 0
and ∆t is interpreted as a cancellation penalty. We impose also a natural assumption that X
(1)
T = Y
(1)
T
and X
(2)
T = Y
(2)
T , i.e. on the maturity date there is no penalty. Therefore, if the seller cancells the
contract at time s while the buyer exercises at time t the former delivers to the latter a package of cash
and stock shares which can be represented as a 2-vector in the form
(5.4) H(s, t) = (H(1)(s, t), H(2)(s, t)) = XsIs<t + YtIt≤s
where IA = 1 if an event A occurs and IA = 0 if not. It will be convenient to allow the payment
components X
(1)
t , X
(2)
t and Y
(1)
t , Y
(2)
t to take on any real (and not only nonnegative) values which will
enable us to demonstrate complete duality (symmetry) between the seller’s and the buyer’s positions.
A pair (σ, pi) of a stopping time σ ≤ T and of a self-financing strategy pi = (αt, βt)Tt=0 will be called a
superhedging strategy for the seller of the game option with a payoff given by (5.4) if for all t ≤ T ,
(5.5) θσ∧t(ασ∧t −H(1)(σ, t), βσ∧t −H(2)(σ, t)) ≥ 0
where, as usual, c ∧ d = min(c, d) and c ∨ d = max(c, d). The seller’s (ask or upper hedging) price V a
of a game option is defined as the infimum of initial amounts required to start a superhedging strategy
for the seller. Since in order to get α0 amount of cash and β0 shares of stock at time 0 the seller should
spend
(5.6) − θ0(−α0,−β0) = α0 + β+0 Sa0 − β−0 Sb0
in cash, we can write
V a = infσ,pi{−θ0(−α0,−β0) : (σ, pi) with(5.7)
pi = (αt, βt)
T
t=0 being a superhedging strategy for the seller}.
On the other hand, the buyer may borrow from a bank an amount θ0(−α0,−β0) to purchase a game
option with the payoff (5.4) and starting with the negative valued portfolio (α0, β0) to manage a self-
financing strategy pi = (αt, βt)
T
t=0 so that for a given stopping time τ ≤ T and all s ≤ T ,
(5.8) θs∧τ (αs∧τ +H
(1)(s, τ), βs∧τ +H
(2)(s, τ)) ≥ 0.
In this case the pair (τ, pi) will be called a superhedging strategy for the buyer. The buyer’s (bid or lower
hedging) price V b of the game option above is defined as the supremum of initial bank loan required to
purchase this game option and to manage a superhedging strategy for the buyer. Thus,
V b = supτ,pi{θ0(−α0,−β0) : (τ, pi) with(5.9)
pi = (αt, βt)
T
t=0 being a superhedging strategy for the buyer}.
It follows from the representations of Theorem 5.1 below that V a ≥ V b.
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First, we recall the notion of a randomized stopping time (see [19], [12], [95] and references there)
which is defined as a nonnegative adapted process χ such that
∑T
t=0 χt = 1. The set of all randomized
stopping times will be denoted by X while the set of all usual or pure stopping times will be denoted by
T . It will be convenient to identify each pure stopping time τ with a randomized stopping time χτ such
that χτt = I{τ=t} for any t = 0, 1, ..., T , so that we could write T ⊂ X . For any adapted process Z and
each randomized stopping time χ the time-χ value of Z is defined by
(5.10) (Z)χ = Zχ =
T∑
t=0
χtZt.
Considering a game option with a payoff given by (5.4) we write also
(5.11) H(χ, χ˜) =
T∑
s,t=0
χsχ˜tH(s, t)
which is the seller’s payment to the buyer when the former cancells and the latter exercises at randomized
stopping times χ and χ˜, respectively. In particular, if σ and τ are pure stopping times then
(5.12) H(χ, χτ ) =
T∑
s=0
χsH(s, τ) and H(χ
σ, χ) =
T∑
t=0
χtH(σ, t).
Next, we introduce the notion of an approximate martingale which is defined for any randomized
stopping time χ as a pair (P, S) of a probability measure P on Ω and of an adapted process S such that
for each t = 0, 1, ..., T ,
(5.13) Sbt ≤ St ≤ Sat and χ∗t+1Sbt ≤ EP (Sχ
∗
t+1|Ft) ≤ χ∗t+1Sat
where EP is the expectation with respect to P ,
(5.14) χ∗t =
T∑
s=t
χs, Z
χ∗
t =
T∑
s=t
χsZs, χ
∗
T+1 = 0 and Z
χ∗
T+1 = 0.
Given a randomized stopping time χ the space of corresponding approximate martingales (P, S) will be
denoted by P¯(χ) and we denote by P(χ) the subspace of P¯(χ) consisting of pairs (P, S) with P being
equivalent to the original (market) probability P.
Next, we introduce some convex analysis notions and notations (see [93] and [95] for more details).
Denote by Θ the family of functions f : R → R ∪ {−∞} such that either f ≡ −∞ or f is a (finite)
real valued polyhedral (continuous piecewise linear with finite number of segments) function. If f, g ∈ Θ
then, clearly, f ∧ g, f ∨ g ∈ Θ. The epigraph of f ∈ Θ is defined by epi(f) = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : x ≥ f(y)}.
For any c ≥ d the function h[d,c](y) = cy− − dy+, clearly, belongs to Θ. Observe that the self-financing
condition (5.2) can be rewritten in the form
(5.15) (αt − αt+1, βt − βt+1) ∈ epi(h[Sbt ,Sat ]).
For each f ∈ Θ and c ≥ d there exists a unique function gr[d,c](f) ∈ Θ such that
(5.16) epi(gr[d,c](f)) = epi(h[d,c]) + epi(f).
For any y ∈ R, µ ∈ Ωt and t = 0, 1, ..., T define qat (y) = qat (µ, y), qbt (y) = qbt (µ, y), rat (y) = rat (µ, y),
rbt (y) = r
b
t (µ, y) by
qat (y) = X
(1)
t + h[Sbt ,Sat ](y −X
(2)
t ), r
a
t (y) = Y
(1)
t + h[Sbt ,Sat ](y − Y
(2)
t )
qbt (y) = −X(1)t + h[Sbt ,Sat ](y +X
(2)
t ), r
b
t (y) = −Y (1)t + h[Sbt ,Sat ](y + Y
(2)
t )
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with h[d,c] the same as in (5.15) and (5.16). Observe that if c ≥ d ≥ 0 then either h[d,c] ≡ 0 or h[d,c] is a
monotone decreasing function, and so
(5.17) qat ≥ rat and qbt ≤ rbt .
Introduce also
Gas,t(y) = H
(1)(s, t) + h[Sbs∧t,Sas∧t](y −H(2)(s, t)) = qas (y)Is<t + rat (y)It≤s and(5.18)
Gbs,t(y) = −H(1)(s, t) + h[Sbs∧t,Sas∧t](y +H(2)(s, t)) = qbs(y)Is<t + rbt (y)It≤s.
Clearly, the superhedging conditions (5.5) of the seller and (5.8) of the buyer are equivalent to
(5.19) (ασ∧t, βσ∧t) ∈ epi(Gaσ,t) for all t = 0, 1, ..., T and
(5.20) (αs∧τ , βs∧τ ) ∈ epi(Gbs,τ ) for all s = 0, 1, ..., T,
respectively. Observe also that
(5.21) qat (0) = −qbt (0) = θt(X(1)t , X(2)t ) and rat (0) = −rbt (0) = θt(Y (1)t , Y (2)t ).
We recall that X
(1)
T = Y
(1)
T and X
(2)
T = Y
(2)
T , and so q
a
T = r
a
T and q
b
T = r
b
T . In [61] the following result
was obtained.
Theorem 5.1. I. Price representations. In the above notations,
V a = minσ∈T maxχ∈X max(P,S)∈P¯(χ) EP
(
H(1)(σ, ·) + SH(2)(σ, ·))
χ
(5.22)
= minσ∈T maxχ∈X sup(P,S)∈P(χ) EP
(
H(1)(σ, ·) + SH(2)(σ, ·))
χ
and
V b = maxτ∈T minχ∈X min(P,S)∈P¯(χ) EP
(
H(1)(·, τ) + SH(2)(·, τ))
χ
(5.23)
= maxτ∈T minχ∈X inf(P,S)∈P(χ) EP
(
H(1)(·, τ) + SH(2)(·, τ))
χ
where H(1)(σ, ·), H(2)(σ, ·) and H(1)(·, τ), H(2)(·, τ) denote functions on {0, 1, ..., T } whose values at t are
obtained by replacing · by t.
II. Recurrent price computations.
(i) For any x ∈ R, µ ∈ ΩT and σ ∈ T define
(5.24) zµT (x) = w
µ
T (x) = r
a
T (µ, x).
Next, for t = 1, 2, ..., T and each µ ∈ Ωt−1 define by backward induction
z
µ
t−1 = maxν⊂µ, ν∈Ωt z
ν
t , w
µ
t−1 = gr[Sbt−1(µ),Sat−1(µ)](z
µ
t−1),
zµt−1(x) = min
(
qat−1(µ, x),max(r
a
t−1(µ, x), w
µ
t−1(x))
)
.
Then z0(0) = V
a.
(ii) For any x ∈ R, µ ∈ ΩT and τ ∈ T define
(5.25) uµT (x) = v
µ
T (x) = r
b
T (µ, x).
Next, for t = 1, 2, ..., T and each µ ∈ Ωt−1 define by the backward induction
u
µ
t−1 = maxν⊂µ, ν∈Ωt u
ν
t , v
µ
t−1 = gr[Sbt−1(µ),Sat−1(µ)](u
µ
t−1),
uµt−1(x) = min
(
rbt−1(µ, x),max(q
b
t−1(µ, x), v
µ
t−1(x))
)
.
Then u0(0) = −V b.
III. Superhedging strategies.
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(i) Construct by induction a sequence of (pure) stopping times σt ∈ T and a self-financing strategy
(α, β) such that
(5.26) (αt, βt) ∈ epi(zt) \ epi(qat ) on {t < σt}
for each t = 0, 1, ..., T in the following way. First, take any F0-measurable portfolio (α0, β0) ∈ epi(z0)
and set
σ0 =
{
0 if (α0, β0) ∈ epi(qa0 )
T if (α0, β0) /∈ epi(qa0 ).
Suppose that an Ft-measurable portfolio (αt, βt) ∈ epi(zt) and a stopping time σt ∈ T have already been
constructed for some t = 0, 1, ...T − 1 so that (5.26) holds true. By (5.16) and (5.25),
(αt, βt) ∈ epi(wt) = epi(h[Sbt ,Sat ]) + epi(zt) on {t < σt},
and so there exists an Ft-measurable portfolio (αt+1, βt+1) such that
(αt+1, βt+1) ∈ epi(zt), (αt − αt+1, βt − βt+1) ∈ epi(h[Sbt ,Sat ]) on {t < σt}
and (αt+1, βt+1) = (αt, βt) on {t ≥ σt} which provides the self-financing condition (5.15) both on {t < σt}
and on {t ≥ σt}. By (5.25) it follows also that (αt+1, βt+1) ∈ epi(zt+1) on {t < σt} ⊃ {t + 1 < σt+1}.
Set
σt+1 =


σt if t ≥ σt
t+ 1 if t < σt and (αt+1, βt+1) ∈ epi(qat+1)
T if t < σt and (αt+1, βt+1) /∈ epi(qat+1).
Finally, set σ = σT ∈ T . Then the pair (σ, pi) with pi = (α, β) constructed by the above algorithm with
(α0, β0) = (V
a, 0) is a superhedging strategy for the seller.
(ii) Construct by induction a sequence of (pure) stopping times τt ∈ T and a self-financing strategy
(α, β) such that
(5.27) (αt, βt) ∈ epi(ut) \ epi(rbt ) on {t < τt}
for each t = 0, 1, ..., T in the following way. First, take any F0-measurable portfolio (α0, β0) ∈ epi(u0)
and set
τ0 =
{
0 if (α0, β0) ∈ epi(rb0)
T if (α0, β0) /∈ epi(rb0).
Suppose that an Ft-measurable portfolio (αt, βt) ∈ epi(ut) and a stopping time τt ∈ T have already been
constructed for some t = 0, 1, ...T − 1 so that (5.26) holds true. By (5.16) and (5.26),
(αt, βt) ∈ epi(vt) = epi(h[Sbt ,Sat ]) + epi(ut) on {t < τt},
and so there exists an Ft-measurable portfolio (αt+1, βt+1) such that
(αt+1, βt+1) ∈ epi(ut), (αt − αt+1, βt − βt+1) ∈ epi(h[Sbt ,Sat ]) on {t < τt}
and (αt+1, βt+1) = (αt, βt) on {t ≥ τt} which provides the self-financing condition (5.15) both on {t < τt}
and on {t ≥ τt}. By (5.26) it follows also that (αt+1, βt+1) ∈ epi(ut+1) on {t < τt} ⊃ {t+1 < τt+1}. Set
τt+1 =


τt if t ≥ τt
t+ 1 if t < τt and (αt+1, βt+1) ∈ epi(rbt+1)
T if t < τt and (αt+1, βt+1) /∈ epi(rbt+1).
Finally, set τ = τT ∈ T . Then the pair (τ, pi) with pi = (α, β) constructed by the above algorithm with
(α0, β0) = (−V b, 0) is a superhedging strategy for the buyer.
There are by now very few papers on game options with transaction costs. In [26] it is shown that the
cheapest superhedging strategy for a game option in a Black-Scholes market with transaction costs is the
buy-and-hold portfolio strategy together with a hitting time of a Borel set. The shortfall risk for a game
option in a Black-Scholes market with transaction costs is obtained in [27] as a limit of corresponding
expressions for a sequence of binomial models in the spirit of Section 4 above.
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